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Introduction
In creating the test to determine whether government employees in the Commonwealth of
Virginia are entitled to the benefit of sovereign tort immunity, the Supreme Court of Virginia
stated, "[a] dmittedly, no single all-inclusive rule can be enunciated or applied in determining
entitlement to sovereign immunity."1 The court, however, managed to formulate a four-part test
to be consistently applied to each situation requiring a determination of whether sovereign
immunity should be granted to a state employee.2 This article will examine the discretion prong
of the four-part test created by the court in James v. Jane and the reasons why the court's
decision to not fully articulate how to apply this prong has produced non-uniform application of
the test by the lower courts when they determine whether sovereign immunity shields an
employee of the Commonwealth from tort liability.3 Having examined the aftermath of the
court's decision in James, it has become clear that a significant number of cases were brought
before the court regarding the appropriate application of the test, particularly with respect to the
discretion prong. Furthermore, after speaking to several practitioners in the Commonwealth
regarding their thoughts on the discretion prong of the four-part test, it has become clear that the
test has not been interpreted uniformly.
Section I of this article will outline a brief discussion of the principles that validate the
doctrine of sovereign immunity. Section II will discuss the history of sovereign immunity in
Virginia leading up to the four-part test created in James. Section III will discuss the aftermath
of James and examine the results in cases in which the Supreme Court of Virginia has applied
the four-part test. Section IV will discuss the opinions of members of the professional
community in the Commonwealth on the effectiveness of the four-part test. Finally, Section V
1 James v. Jane, 221 Va. 43, 53, 282 S.E.2d 864, 869 (1980).
' See id.
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will conclude this article with a suggestion on how to handle sovereign immunity cases in the
future.
I. Why the King and His Men Should Not Be Sued: A Brief History of the Public
Policy Reasons Behind the Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity
The doctrine of sovereign immunity was introduced in 1788 in Russell v. Men of Devon,
an English case. 4 The doctrine originally rested on the notion that "the king must not, was not
allowed, not entitled, to do wrong." 5 The idea was that the king could not be brought into his
own court and sued because it was impossible for someone to be the "judge of his own cause."
6
Over time, however, the doctrine came to stand for the belief that the king himself was incapable
of doing wrong.
7
Twenty-four years after Russell was decided in England, the doctrine of sovereign
immunity was adopted by the first American court in Mower v. Leicester.8 Critics of the doctrine
asserted that "the 'king can do no wrong' concept seems to have been against what the framers
of the Constitution fought for at that time." 9 For example, in Jones v. State Highway
Commission, the Supreme Court of Missouri abolished sovereign immunity for state employees,
stating: "[i]nherent in the governmental-proprietary theory developed by the courts.., is the
4 Edward W. Taylor, A Re-examination of Sovereign Tort Immunity in Virginia, 15 U. RICH. L. REV. 247, 250 (1981)
(citing Russell v. Men of Devon, (1788) 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (K.B.)). Mr. Taylor points out that this decision was
handed down in England after the signing of the Declaration of Independence. Id.
5 Peter J. Smith, States as Nations: Dignity in Cross-Doctrinal Perspective, 89 VA. L. REV. 1, 29 (2003) (quoting
Louis L. Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77 HARv. L. REV. 1, 4 (1963)).
6 W. HAMILTON BRYSON, BRYSON ON VIRGINIA CIVIL PROCEDURE 177 (3d ed. 1997).
7 Id. (quoting 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries *244) (emphasis added); see also James E. Phander, Rethinking
the Supreme Court's Original Jurisdiction in State-Party Cases, 82 CAL. L. REV. 555, 578-79 (1994). According to
James E. Phander, Associate Professor of Law, University of Illinois College of Law, there are two schools of
thought regarding the history of sovereign immunity, the "'profound shock' school of Eleventh Amendment
thought" and the "revisionist" school of thought. Id. at 578-79. Profound shock theorists believe that the Supreme
Court's rejection of sovereign immunity in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419 (1793) caused so much shock and
surprise to the states that they chose to ratify the Eleventh Amendment "to restore the original understanding" of
sovereign immunity. Id. at 578. Thus, profound shock theorists would adhere to the "King can do no wrong"
concept. Id. at 579. Revisionists "emphasize that even in Great Britain, the doctrine did not establish a complete bar
to relief against either the crown or its officers." Id. at 580.
8 9 Mass. 247, 250 (1812).
9 Taylor, supra note 4, at 251.
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tacit recognition that courts do have the power to modify the doctrine of sovereign immunity,
and if there is the power to abrogate in part, there is a right to abrogate completely." 10 Just one
year after the Supreme Court of Missouri's decision, however, Missouri's state legislature
enacted a statute that codified the doctrine of sovereign immunity and nullified the court's
decision in Jones. I I
Likewise, "the doctrine of sovereign immunity is 'alive and well' in Virginia."'12 It is
well established that the doctrine of sovereign immunity protects municipalities from tort
liability arising from the exercise of governmental functions. 13 The court in Hoggard v. City of
Richmond explained that a municipality is immune from liability for negligence when
performing "governmental" functions, but can be held liable for negligence when performing
"proprietary" functions. 14 While the court noted in Hoggard that the basis of the distinction
between governmental and proprietary "is difficult to state," the court stated, "[g]enerally it is
applied to escape difficulties, in order that injustice may not result from the recognition of
technical defenses based upon the governmental character of such [municipal] corporations."
' 15
Thus, the reasons the doctrine of sovereign immunity remains alive today vary and include, but
are not limited to, the following:
[P]rotecting the public purse, providing for smooth operation of government,
eliminating public inconvenience and danger that might spring from officials
being fearful to act, assuring that citizens will be willing to take public jobs, and
10 557 S.W.2d 225, 229 (Mo. 1977).
1 State of Missouri ex rel. Missouri Div. of Family Serv. v. Moore, 657 S.W.2d 32, 34 (1983).
12 Messina v. Burden, 228 Va. 301, 307, 321 S.E.2d 657, 660 (1984).
13 Hoggard v. City of Richmond, 172 Va. 145, 147-48, 200 S.E. 610, 611 (1939). Interestingly, the court also made
reference to a ministerial act and a discretionary act stating, "[t]he operation of a swimming and bathing pool by a
municipality under the provisions of its charter, or the general law, is a ministerial act, and that where a wrongful act
causing injury is committed by the servants of a municipality in the performance of a purely ministerial act, the
municipal corporation is liable as any other private corporation, even though it does not derive any pecuniary
advantage from such activity." Id. at 157, 200 S.E. at 615-16. See also Niese v. City of Alexandria, 264 Va. 230,
238, 564 S.E.2d 127, 132 (2002).14 Hoggard, 172 Va. at 147-48, 200 S.E.2d at 611.
15 Id. at 154, 200 S.E.2d at 614.
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preventing citizens from improperly influencing the conduct of governmental
affairs through the threat or use of vexatious litigation. 16
It follows then that these protections should be afforded to the sovereign's employees
because "unless the protection of the doctrine extends to some of the people who help run the
government, the majority of the purposes for the doctrine will remain unaddressed."'17 "The
State can only act through individuals," therefore, it would be nonsensical to limit protection to
the sovereign only. 18 Although sovereign immunity shields the state and its employees from tort
liability in certain situations, there is no law that precludes the state from voluntarily allowing
itself to be sued. 19
While the common law reasons for the doctrine of sovereign immunity traditionally
rested on the notion that the "king can do no wrong," 20 the more modem approach is based on
the "desire to limit judicial interference with the workings of govemment." 21 In implementing
this modem approach, the courts are "forced to balance two competing interests: (1) the
functional government unencumbered by the courts; and (2) the need of injured parties for
judicial relief., 22 The Supreme Court of Virginia has attempted to strike a balance between these
modem competing interests while preserving some of the traditional theories behind sovereign
immunity.
16 Messina supra note 12, at 308, 321 S.E.2d at 660. While sovereign immunity is "alive and well" in Virginia, the
Commonwealth has allowed actions against the state or its governmental agencies based on tort with the passing of
the Virginia Tort Claims Act in 1981. Cf Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-195.1 (2006) et. seq. Of course, the liability of the
Commonwealth in such actions is limited by the parameters set forth in the Act.
17 Messina, 228 Va. at 308, 321 S.E.2d at 661.
18 id.
19 Bryson, supra note 6, at 178.
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II. Sovereign Immunity in Virginia and an Analysis of the Court's decision in James v.
Jane
A. Sovereign Immunity in Virginia Before James v. Jane
In Rives v. Bolling, the Supreme Court of Virginia held that a state police officer was
liable in damages for the death of a twenty-six year old woman when he accidentally shot her
while cleaning his revolver.23 The police officer had twirled his loaded revolver on his finger
while in the process of cleaning it and the revolver discharged, killing the victim.24 Because the
police officer was required to keep his revolver clean for inspection, he argued that he was acting
within the scope of his employment with the state when the incident occurred, so he could not be
liable for damages under the doctrine of sovereign immunity.25 The court held that "[i]t was a
negligent and improper performance of the officer's duty to twirl a loaded revolver upon his
finger while he was in the process of cleaning his revolver or in the act of returning it to his
holster." 26 That is, in order to clean the revolver, which was the officer's duty, the officer was
not required to twirl the revolver on his finger. The court analogized that
[I]t was as much an unlawful and improper performance of his
duty as if he had, in patrolling his district, in the manner and means
provided by the State, recklessly driven his service automobile
against the decedent in an effort to show her how fast he could
drive the vehicle.27
Consequently, the court opened the door for individual liability of a state employee who
negligently performs an official duty.
28
Shortly after its decision in Rives, and well before the passing of the Virginia Tort Claims
Act, the Supreme Court of Virginia recognized in Sayers v. Bullar, "It would be an unwise
23 180 Va. 124, 130-31, 21 S.E.2d 775, 777-78 (1942).
24Id. at 127, 21 S.E.2d at 776.
25 Id. at 128-130, 21 S.E.2d at 776-77.
26Id. at 130, S.E.2d at 777 (emphasis added).
2 7 
id.
2 8Willett, supra note 20, at 432 (noting that after the court's decision in Rives, "[i]t is possible that an officer or
agent of the state may be liable for simple negligence in the performance of ministerial tasks, while the state itself is
not, even thought the negligence occurred within the officer's assigned duties.").
Winter 2008
Richmond Journal ofLaw and the Public Interest
policy to permit agents and employees of the state to be sued in their personal capacity for acts
done by them at the express direction of the State, unless they depart from that direction." 29 In
Sayers, employees of the state were laying pipeline from a state owned spring to a state-owned
fishing hatchery, which required them to blast through limestone. 30 The blasting caused a spring
on the plaintiff s property to cease to flow.31 The plaintiff sued the employees of the
Commonwealth and the court found that the employees were agents of the state, thus there was
no cause of action because the state could not be sued under the doctrine of sovereign
immunity. 32 In finding that the employees were not liable because they were not acting as
individuals, but as employees of the state, the court stated that there had been no allegation that
the employees "were not acting in a purely ministerial capacity." 33 In Rives, the issue was
whether the state employee had negligently performance of an official duty,34 while the issue in
Sayers was whether the state employee was performing a ministerial act or a discretionary act.
35
In Sayers, the act of locating the water line was discretionary, while the act of blasting was
ministerial.36 It is clear that the focus of the analysis in both Rives and Sayers is different, yet
both cases determine whether an employee of the Commonwealth is immune under the doctrine
of sovereign immunity.
After Sayers and the introduction of the concept of distinguishing between ministerial
and discretionary activities, the Supreme Court of Virginia decided Crabbe v. County School
Board.37 The court held that a teacher at a public high school was liable for negligently allowing
29 180 Va. 222, 229, 22 S.E.2d 9, 12 (1942).
'0 Id. at 224-25, 22 S.E.2d at 10.
" Id. at 224, 22 S.E.2d at 10.
12Id. at 227-29, 22 S.E.2d at 11-12.
33 Id. at 230, 22 S.E.2d at 13.
14 180 Va. at 126, 21 S.E.2d at 775.
15 180 Va. at 230, 22 S.E.2d at 12-13.
16 Id. at 230, 22 S.E.2d at 12-13.
17 209 Va. 356, 164 S.E.2d 639 (1968).
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a student to use a defective power table saw and failing to instruct the student properly on how to
use the saw.38 Both the student's teacher and the school board were sued in Crabbe.39 With
respect to the school board, the court held that "in the operation of a school a school board is
performing a governmental function and hence is immune from personal liability for personal
injuries sustained by a pupil and caused by the alleged negligence of an instructor .... 40 With
respect to the teacher, however, the court held that the teacher's actions were not imputed to the
state because the teacher was negligent in performing his teaching duties.4 1 The court stated that
the teacher "knew or should have known" that the tool was defective and did not instruct the
student properly.4 2 Rather than basing its analysis on the "ministerial" versus "discretionary"
issue outlined in Sayers, the court based its decision on its prior holding in Elder v. Holland (a
case similar to Rives in that the issue was negligent performance of an official duty) that "a state
employee may be held liable for negligent conduct in the performance of his duties, although the
State itself is immune from liability by reason of such acts of its employee."
43
At this point, it is beginning to become clear that not all sovereign immunity cases are
alike. There are several ways that the issue of sovereign immunity can be analyzed, and which
analysis applies will depend on the factual circumstances of each case. While the court chose to
apply a negligent performance of an official duty analysis in Crabbe, as it did in Rives, it could
38 Id. at 359, 164 S.E.2d at 641.
39 Id. at 359-60, 164 S.E.2d at 641-42.4 0 Id. at 358, 164 S.E.2d at 640.
41 Id. at 359, 164 S.E.2d at 641-42.
42 Id.
41 Id. at 359-360, 164 S.E.2d at 641 (citing Elder v. Holland, 208 Va. 15, 18-19, 155 S.E.2d 369, 372 (1967)). The
court also held in Elder that state employees will be held liable for intentional torts, regardless of whether they are
acting within the scope of their employment as state employees. Id. at 19, S.E.2d at 372-73.
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just have easily applied a discretionary versus ministerial analysis, as it did in Sayers. That is, in
choosing how to instruct a student, are not a teacher's actions discretionary?
44
Following its decisions in Rives, Sayers, and Crabbe, the Supreme Court of Virginia
attempted to consolidate its prior holdings in Lawhorne v. Harlan.45 The court held that the
doctrine of sovereign immunity is available to "an employee of the state or of one of its agencies
who performs supervisory functions or exercises discretionary judgment within the scope of his
employment." 46 The court continued, "[h]owever, an employee of a state agency who performs
duties which do not involve judgment or discretion but which are purely ministerial, is liable for
injury which results from his negligence." 47 Thus, the court appeared to be clarifying that it
would be appropriate to apply a discretionary versus ministerial analysis in a sovereign immunity
case involving government employees. In Lawhorne, the plaintiff claimed that two hospital
administrators and one surgical resident at the University of Virginia Hospital misdiagnosed a
patient, causing the patient's death.48 The court held that by virtue of their positions, the two
hospital administrators were "exercising discretionary power in performing their duties as
administrators of the hospital and they were clearly entitled to have their pleas of immunity
sustained. 4 9 As for the surgical resident, the court held that he too was an employee of the
Commonwealth, "vested with and required to exercise discretion and judgment in connection
with those persons who presented themselves as patients at the emergency room of the
44 Willet, supra note 20, at 434. Willet poses this exact same question. Several years later, the Supreme Court of
Virginia agreed with Willet. The court in Lentz v. Morris overruled Crabbe v. County School Bd. holding that a
teacher's supervisory actions in the classroom "clearly involves, at least in part, the exercise ofjudgment and
discretion by the teacher." Lentz v. Morris, 236 Va. 78, 83, 372 S.E.2d 608, 611 (1988). In overruling Crabbe,
however, the court still declined to define "discretion" or clarify the weight to be given to each prong of the four-
part test initially outlined in James v. Jane.
4' 214 Va. 405, 200 S.E.2d 569 (1973).
46 Id. at 407, 200 S.E.2d at 571 (emphasis added).
47 Id. (citing Wynn v. Gandy, 170 Va. 590, 197 S.E. 527 (1938)); see also Rives v. Bolling, 180 Va. 124, 21 S.E.2d
775 (1942) (emphasis added).
481 Id. at 406-07, 200 S.E.2d at 571.
49 Id. at 407, 200 S.E.2d at 572 (emphasis added).
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hospital., 50 Thus, the court focused on discretion in this case, but it did not elaborate on the
ministerial portion of the analysis.
Shortly after the court's decision in Lawhorne, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit defined the term "ministerial act." In Semler v. Psychiatric Inst., the court defined
a ministerial act as ". . . one which a person performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed
manner, in obedience to the mandate of legal authority, without regard to, or the exercise of, his
own judgment upon the propriety of the act being done." 51 While sovereign immunity is a state
law issue, this federal case is instructive for purposes of determining what the Supreme Court of
Virginia intended when it indicated that a discretionary act should be treated differently than a
ministerial act for purposes of determining immunity. In Semler, a probation officer awarded
several passes to a patient at the Institute for Psychiatric Treatment in Fairfax County, Virginia
without submitting them to a state judge for approval as was required of him.52 The officer
arranged for the patient to live at home while participating in an outpatient program without
submitting this arrangement for approval to a judge.53 During this outpatient program, the
patient murdered the daughter of the plaintiff and the plaintiff sued the probation officer (among
others).54 The court held that the probation officer's "basic policy decisions are discretionary
and hence immune, but his acts implementing the policy must be considered on a case-by-case
basis to determine whether they are ministerial.,55 The court held that the probation officer was
required to submit his change of the patient's status to a judge for approval, which was a
50Id. at 408, 200 S.E.2d at 572 (emphasis added).
51 538 F.2d 121, 127 (4th Cir. 1976) (citing Dovel v. Bertram, 184 Va. 19, 22, 34 S.E.2d 369, 376 (1945)).
52Id. at 123-24.
531Id. at 124.
54 Id. at 123.
51 Id. at 127 (emphasis added).
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"ministerial" act by the court's definition, thus the probation officer was not shielded from
liability under the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
56
The holding of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Semler, as
well as the Supreme Court of Virginia's holding in Lawhorne, stand for the proposition that
when performing a ministerial act, an employee of the state will not be able to shield himself or
herself from liability by using the doctrine of sovereign immunity if he or she fails to perform
that ministerial act correctly.57 By defining "ministerial act" in Semler, the Fourth Circuit Court
of Appeals provided the Supreme Court of Virginia with a basis for solidifying its analysis of
determining whether or not the doctrine of sovereign immunity will shield an employee of the
Commonwealth from liability. 58 What Semler did not clarify, however, is the definition of
"discretion" or a "discretionary act." In addition, the question remained: How does the court
decide whether an act is "discretionary" as opposed to "ministerial?
59
Despite the factual and analytical disparities in Rives, Sayers, Crabbe, and Lawhorne, at
this point the Supreme Court of Virginia appeared to have a basis for creating a single test for
determining when a government employee is immune from liability pursuant to the doctrine of
sovereign immunity -- immunity rests upon a determination of whether the employee is
performing a ministerial act or a discretionary act. Since the Semler decision defined what
56 See id.
57 Willet, supra note 20, at 431.
5' Keep in mind that this is assuming that the analysis continues to remain one of a discretionary act versus a
ministerial act. As discussed more fully in upcoming portions of this article, the court's analysis will vary
depending on what type of case the court is dealing with. That is, when the court is deciding a case involving
professional services (i.e. doctors), the court appears to abandon the discretionary act versus ministerial act analysis
and apply a different type of analysis. This all begins, of course, with the deciding of James v. Jane, 221 Va. 43,
282 S.E.2d 864 (1980).
59 Willet, supra note 20, at 433-34. Willet poses a similar question and states it "is an important one since it directly
affects the degree of negligence the plaintiff must prove in order to impose liability." Id. at 433-34. To make his
point, Willet cites to Crabbe v. County School Bd., 209 Va. 356, 164 S.E.2d 639, (1968). Willet notes that in
Crabbe, the court found a teacher at a public high school liable for the negligent operation of an electric saw;
however, teaching surely involves "discretionary judgment." Id. at 434. Notably, Crabbe was eventually overruled
by Lentz v. Morris, which held that teaching is a "discretionary" act. See supra note 44 and accompanying text; see
also infra note 138 and accompanying text.
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constituted a ministerial act, it seemed that all that was left for the Supreme Court of Virginia to
do was adopt that definition and outline its own definition for what constituted a discretionary
act. Thus, one would anticipate that at its next opportunity to analyze a sovereign immunity
case, the Supreme Court of Virginia would have followed the lead of the United States Court of
Appeals by re-delineating its discretionary versus ministerial analysis in Lawhorne, adopting the
Court of Appeals' definition of a ministerial act, and outlining its own definition of a
discretionary act. This, however, is not what happened. The court's next opportunity to analyze
a sovereign immunity case was James v. Jane, and as discussed below, rather than solidify an
analysis that was already partially in place, the Supreme Court of Virginia decided to create a
seemingly unprecedented four-part test. 61
B. The Four-Part Test Created in James v. Jane
Following the court's decisions in Rives, Sayers, Crabbe, and Lawhorne, the Supreme
Court of Virginia created a four-part test in James v. Jane, purportedly combining the principles
of the aforementioned cases, to determine whether an employee of the Commonwealth is entitled
to protection from liability under the doctrine of sovereign immunity. 62 Unfortunately, however,
the four-part test created in James did not make it any easier to determine whether an employee
would be immune under the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Rather than elaborate on its
analysis of a discretionary act versus a ministerial act, which seemed to be the next logical step
for the court, the court created a new four-part test.63 Not only was this test novel in comparison
to prior cases dealing with sovereign immunity for government employees, but the court did not
60 Semler, 538 F.2d at 127.
61 James, 221 Va. at 53, 282 S.E.2d at 869.
62 Id. at 53, 282 S.E.2d at 869; see also Messina v. Burden, 228 Va. 301, 313, 321 S.E.2d 657, 663 (1984) (re-
iterating the four-part test shortly after James was decided).
63 James, 221 Va. at 53, 282 S.E.2d at 869.
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address the issue of the determination of a ministerial versus a discretionary act and how it would
fit into the four-part test.
64
In James, two personal injury cases were consolidated because the issues involved in
each suit were identical.65 Plaintiff Paul S. James ("Plaintiff James") sought to recover damages
from Dr. John A. Jane and Dr. Hans 0. Riddervold for personal injuries he sustained as a result
of the alleged negligent acts of both doctors in connection with a myelogram performed on
Plaintiff James. 66 Plaintiff David L. Lawrence ("Plaintiff Lawrence") sought to recover damages
from Dr. Michael W. Hackela, Jr. for personal injuries he sustained as a result of Dr. Hackala's
alleged negligent acts in performing an operation on Plaintiff Lawrence. 67 Each of the defendant
doctors was licensed to practice medicine and each was employed as a full-time faculty member
at the Medical School of the University of Virginia. 68 Dr. Jane was Chairman of the Department
of Neurosurgery at the Medical School and Chief of Neurosurgery at the University of Virginia
Hospital; Dr. Riddervold was an Associate Professor of Radiology at the Medical School and a
member of the hospital staff in the Radiology Department.69 Dr. Hakala was an Assistant
Professor of Orthopedic Surgery and Rehabilitation as well as Pediatrics in the Medical School,
and an attending staff physician at the hospital.70 At trial there was testimony that attending
physicians had "the privilege to select the patients they will treat and are under no obligation to
accept any individual or class of persons as patients. 71 Residents and interns in training did not
enjoy the same privilege and were expected to treat any patient assigned to them. 72 The court
64 See generally, James v. Jane, 221 Va. 43, 282 S.E.2d 864 (1981).65 James, 221 Va. at 46, 282 S.E.2d at 864.
66 Id. at 45, 282 S.E.2d. at 864.
67 id.
68 Id. at 46, 282 S.E.2d at 864.
69 id.
70 id.
71 Id. at 47, 282 S.E.2d at 866.
72 id.
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explained that "the attending physicians of patients exercise broad discretion in selecting the
methods by which they care for them," which implies that residents do not.73
In deciding whether or not the doctors in this case would be entitled to immunity under
the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the court considered four factors: (1) the nature of the
function performed by the employee; (2) the extent of the state's interest and involvement in the
function; (3) the degree of control and direction exercised by the state over the employee; and (4)
whether the act complained of involved the use of judgment and discretion.74 The court held that
none of these doctors were protected from liability under the doctrine of sovereign immunity
stating:
[i]mplicit in the employment by the University of Virginia of physicians to teach
in its Medical School and to attend patients in its Hospital, is the understanding
that they will use reasonable care in the performance of their duties. A failure to
use such care in the treatment of patients is a violation of their duty to the patients
and a departure from a condition of their employment. A physician who fails to
use reasonable care in the treatment of a patient acts at his own risk, and is not
entitled to invoke the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
75
The court's rationale was based on its prior holding in Sayers that if an employee of the state
exceeds its authority and violates their duty, they "act at their own risk." 76 The court further
based its decision on the premise that, "[a]lthough a valid reason exists for state employee
immunity, the argument for such immunity does not have the same strength it had in past
years., 77 The court explained that the government has intruded into areas that were "formerly
private," and because of this intrusion, the amount of government employees has dramatically
increased.78 The court pointed out that the present day employee is completely different from an
7 Id. at 48, 282 S.E.2d at 866 (emphasis added).
74 1d. at 53, 282 S.E.2d at 869 (emphasis added).
75 Id. at 55, 282 S.E.2d at 870.
76 Id. (citing Eriksen v. Anderson, 195 Va. 655, 660-61, 79 S.E.2d 596, 600 (1954)).
77 1d. at 52, 282 S.E.2d at 869.781d. at 52-53, 282 S.E.2d at 869.
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employee of the eighteenth century sovereign, thus those who truly must remain immune "are
inclusive of, but not limited to, the Governor, state officials, and judges" due to their requirement
to "exercise broad discretionary powers, often involving both the determination and
implementation of state policy.
79
While the policy reasons behind its holding are not unfounded, the court continued to
refer to "discretion;" however it did not refer to the difference between performing a
discretionary act versus performing a ministerial act, which had been the basis for its prior
holdings in sovereign immunity cases involving government employees. 80 With respect to the
first three prongs of the test it created, the court found that (1) the function of the employees in
this case was to operate a "good medical school" and provide patients with "proper medical
care;" 81 (2) the Commonwealth's interest and involvement in that function was slight because
their interest was not limited to this particular public hospital, but that the state has an interest in
private hospitals providing proper medical care, and they had little involvement with each
individual patient;82 and (3) the degree and control by the state over each physician in the
treatment accorded to each patient was also "slight" because it was the physicians rendering care
to each individual. 83 With respect to the "discretion" prong of the test, however, the court did
not fully elaborate. Instead, the court conceded that "[v]irtually every act performed by a person
involves the exercise of some discretion."
84
Again, rather than defining a "discretionary act," perhaps by comparing it to a ministerial
act as the court had done in the past, the court seemed to lump together the "degree and control
79 1d. at 53, 282 S.E.2d at 869 (emphasis added).
80 See Section I(A) of this Article, outlining the court's sovereign immunity decisions prior to James.
81 James, 221 Va. at 54, 282 S.E.2d at 870.
82 id.
83 id.
84 1d. at 53, 282 S.E.2d at 869 (emphasis added).
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of the state" prong of its four-part test with the "use of judgment and discretion" prong of its
four-part test.85 The court explained, "[a]t the point when the physician agrees to treat or operate
on a certain patient, although his employment by the University makes possible the arrangement,
the relationship becomes the personal and confidential one of doctor and patient, not the
Commonwealth of Virginia and patient."
86
The court then stated, "[t]he exercise by the attending physician of his professional skill
and judgment in treating his patient, and the means and methods used, from the very nature of
things, are not subject to the control and direction of others. ' 87 Thus, the court took its focus
away from the amount of "discretion" the employee used in doing his job, and focused instead
on the amount of actual control the Commonwealth had over the employee when he is caring for
any given patient. 88 Although the doctors exercised "broad discretion" in selecting the methods
by which they cared for each patient, because they could choose which patients they would treat,
they were not under enough "control and direction" of the state to be protected under the doctrine
of sovereign immunity.
89
The concurring opinion in this case pointed out that the majority unsuccessfully
distinguished "between full-time members of the faculty of the University of Virginia Medical
School, held not to be immune from liability for negligence in the present case, and the hospital
administrators and the surgical intern of the same institution, held to be immune in Lawhorne."
90
Arguably, the doctors in both situations exercised equal amounts of discretion, yet the court
failed to define how the discretion was different in each case. Perhaps a definition of
85 id.
86 1d. at 50, 282 S.E.2d at 867.
87 1d. at 50-51, 282 S.E.2d at 867-868 (emphasis added).
88 See id. at 50-52, 282 S.E.2d at 867-68 (citing Sayers v. Bullar, 180 Va. 222, 229, 22 S.E.2d 9, 12 (1942)).
89 1d. at 54, 282 S.E.2d at 870.
90 Id. at 55, 282 S.E.2d at 870-871.
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"discretion" or "discretionary act" would have clarified the court's rationale. On the other hand,
perhaps the court intended for the discretion prong of the four-part test in James to be applied as
the "discretionary act versus ministerial act" analysis that the court had outlined in Lawhorne,
9 1
but merely failed to delineate such an intention. Because of a lack of clarity with respect to the
proper application of the "discretion" prong, the lower courts continue to wrestle with the
application of the James four-part test in conjunction with creating uniform results in cases
where the doctrine of sovereign immunity is invoked, specifically with respect to applying the
discretion prong.
III. The Aftermath: A Case by Case Analysis of the Decisions Following James v. Jane
A. Banks v. Sellers - 1982
Following its decision in James, the Supreme Court of Virginia decided Banks v.
Sellers.92 In Banks, the issue was "whether a plea of sovereign immunity is available to a
division superintendent of schools and a high school principal in a negligence action." 93 A high
school student was stabbed by another student during school hours and on school premises.
94
The parents of the injured student sued the superintendent and principal of the school for failing
to provide a safe environment for their daughter. 95 After briefly chronicling the state of the law
with respect to sovereign immunity, the court cited to James as the basis for its decision.
96
The court stated, "[i]n James we enumerated the factors to be considered in deciding
where the lines of immunity shall be drawn. They were (1) the function of the office; (2) the use
91 See supra notes 45-50 and accompanying text.
92 224 Va. 168, 294 S.E.2d 862 (1982).
9' Id. at 169, 294 S.E.2d at 863.
94 id.
95 id.
96 Id. at 171, 294 S.E.2d at 864.
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of judgment and discretion (a consideration not necessarily determinative); and (3) the degree of
control and direction exercised by the state."
97
Notably, rather than cite the factors exactly how they had been outlined in James, the
court in Banks chose not to include the "state's interest and involvement in the function" as one
of the factors to be considered in this case.98 The court then went on to examine the method of
selection of a superintendent and held that the superintendent was entitled to sovereign immunity
because "a... superintendent is a supervisory official who exercises powers involving a
considerable degree ofjudgment and discretion."99 Thus, while the court stated that the use of
judgment and discretion prong is "not necessarily determinative,"' 100 the court seemed to base its
finding of immunity for the superintendent on this very factor.
1 1
Similarly, with respect to the principal, the court held that the principal "performs a large
number of discretionary and managerial functions in the school and, therefore, is entitled to the
same immunity."' 1 2 The court, again, based its decision on "discretion" but did not define the
meaning of "discretion" or a "discretionary act." Furthermore, the court's application of the
four-part test was slightly different in this case than in James, as the court focused primarily on
state control as the determinative factor in James.103 Thus, at this point, the court has applied the
four-part test that it created in James citing only three parts, and as in James, the court did not
clarify how the discretion prong should be applied.
97 id.
98 James, 221 Va. at 53, 282 S.E.2d at 869.
99 Banks, 224 Va. at 173, 294 S.E.2d at 865 (emphasis added).100Id at 171, 294 S.E.2d at 864.
101 Id. at 173, 294 S.E.2d at 865.
102 Id. (emphasis added).
103 See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
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B. Bowers v. Virginia Department of Highways & Transportation - 1983
A year after its decision in Banks, the court decided Bowers v. Virginia Department of
Highways & Transportation.10 4 Bowers was injured as a result of a fall through a "culvert-type
bridge" installed by the Virginia Department of Highways and Transportation (the
"Department") and sued the Department, Mr. Marston, the Commissioner of the Department, and
other employees of the state based on the alleged negligent installation of a culvert-type
bridge. 105 One of Bowers' theories of liability was based on the court's analysis in James. 
106
Bowers argued that Marston, much like the physicians in James, had "complete discretion" in
constructing the culvert-type bridge. 10 7 The court rejected this argument and stated, "[i]n the
typical situation where a state employee has been charged with simple negligence, the presence
of discretion traditionally has been one of the indicia of entitlement to immunity. Indeed, James
v. Jane recognizes this proposition, but cautions that 'it is not always determinative." '' 10 8 The
court went on to explain that, "although Marston may have been vested with broad discretion, he
did not have the 'complete autonomy and control' the physicians possessed in James."10 9 The
court held that Marston "did not enjoy absolute independence of decision and action," and that
Marston was "a subordinate employee of the Department and, by law, subject to the direction
and control of the State Highway and Transportation Commissioner."
110
Thus, rather than define "discretion" or better articulate its intent with respect to the
discretion prong, as noted above, the court stated, "[i]t is not always determinative."111 The
court then shifted its focus to the "control and direction of the state" prong, presumably to avoid
104 225 Va. 245, 302 S.E.2d 511 (1983).
105 Id. at 247, 302 S.E.2d at 512.
106 Id. at 250, 302 S.E.2d at 514.
107Id. at 252, 302 S.E.2d at 515.
108 Id. at 253, 302 S.E.2d at 515 (citing James v. Jane, 221 Va. 43, 53, 282 S.E.2d 864, 869 (1980)).
109 Bowers, 225 Va. at 253, 302 S.E.2d at 515.
110 Id.
111 Bowers, 225 Va. at 253, 302 S.E.2d at 515 (citing James, 221 Va. at 53, 282 S.E.2d at 869).
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having to define discretion or outline how to apply the discretion prong. 112 In essence, the court
found that Marston was entitled to immunity under the doctrine of sovereign immunity
irrespective of discretion. 113 Therefore, at this point, the court had applied the James test in two
cases, deciding one case on the basis of discretion (Banks),'1 14 while overlooking discretion in
another case and deciding it on the basis of state control (Bowers).'15 Again, the court had not
made any reference to a ministerial act, which, as discussed above, had been a fairly large part of
the sovereign immunity analysis prior to James.
C. Messina v. Burden - 1984
Four years after its decision in James, in Messina v. Burden the Supreme Court of
Virginia again outlined the state of the law in Virginia on sovereign immunity and attempted to
create a uniform application of the doctrine. 116 The court consolidated two appeals into one
decision in Messina because each appeal presented "the same issue from slightly different
perspectives." 1 17 In the first case, Frank Messina was injured when he tripped and fell on a
stairway behind the stage when performing in a play at the Frederick Campus of the Tidewater
Community College."i8 Messina sued the college's superintendent of buildings, William
Burden, and was appealing the lower court's decision sustaining Burden's plea of sovereign
immunity. 119 In the second case, Leonard Armstrong was injured when he stepped on a
defective manhole cover in a street in Arlington County. 12 Armstrong sued Dennis R. Johnson,
112 See id., 302 S.E.2d at 515.
113 Id.
114 Banks, 224 Va. at 173, 294 S.E.2d at 865.
115 Bowers, 225 Va. at 253, 302 S.E.2d at 515.
116 228 Va. 301, 321 S.E.2d 657 (1984).
117Id. at 304, 321 S.E.2d at 658.
118 Id. at 305, 321 S.E.2d at 659.
119 Id. at 321 S.E.2d at 659.
120 Id. at 305, 321 S.E.2d at 659.
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the Chief of the Operations Division of the Department of Public Works, and appealed the trial
court's decision to sustain Armstrong's plea of sovereign immunity. 121
In Messina, neither discretion, nor any other prong of the James test, was a major issue
on appeal; instead, the main issue was deciding which government employees (lower level
versus higher level) were entitled to immunity. 122 In other words, the court examined the issue
of which government employees are eligible to plead immunity pursuant to the James four-part
test. The court first discussed the purposes of the doctrine of sovereign immunity as well as the
general principles attributable to the doctrine. 123 With respect to Messina's appeal, the court held
that Burden was clearly a supervisory employee of the Commonwealth of Virginia acting within
the scope of his employment, thus was entitled to immunity. 124 As for Armstrong's appeal, the
court held, "[i]f an individual works for an immune governmental entity then, in a proper case,
that individual will be eligible for the protection afforded by the doctrine [of sovereign
immunity]" and in this case, Johnson met this standard. 125 Thus, while the court clarified who is
eligible to plead immunity under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the court's decision in
Messina did not bring the Commonwealth closer to an understanding of how the discretion prong
of the James test should be applied.
Acknowledging the inconsistencies in sovereign immunity cases both before and after
James, the dissent in Messina stated that the court's prior opinions on sovereign immunity
"cannot be reconciled."' 126 The dissent explained that first, the court decided Crabbe, holding
that the government employee was not entitled to immunity despite the fact that he exercised
121 Id. at 305-06, 321 S.E.2d at 659.
122Id. at 310, 321 S.E.2d at 662.
123 Id. at 307-09, 321 S.E.2d at 659-6 1.
124Id. at 310, 321 S.E.2d at 662.
125 Id. at 312-13, 321 S.E.2d at 663-64.
126Id. at 316-17, 321 S.E.2d at 665-66 (Cochran, J., dissenting).
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discretion in performing his duties. 127 Subsequently, the court decided Lawhorne, and relied on
the distinction between discretionary and ministerial acts to determine whether an employee was
entitled to immunity. 128 Because the hospital employees in Lawhorne exercised discretion, they
were immune.129 Shortly after Lawhorne, however, the court decided James and, without
overruling Lawhorne, held that "because they exercised complete discretion in their work," the
employees were not immune. 13 Thus, while Messina attempted to reconcile sovereign immunity
case law by determining who is eligible to plead immunity under the doctrine, the court did not
address the lingering issue of how the discretion prong of the James test should be applied or
whether the court should consider the distinction between discretionary and ministerial acts as
part of its analysis.
D. Lentz v. Morris - 1988
Following Messina, the Supreme Court of Virginia decided Lentz v. Morris, in which the
court again attempted to reconcile the state of the law of sovereign immunity in the
Commonwealth of Virginia. 13 1 Lentz involved facts extremely similar to those in Short v.
Griffitts132 and Crabbe v. County School Board.133 In both Short and Crabbe, school employees
were sued by students when the students were injured on school grounds during school hours.
134
The court declined to grant immunity to the officials involved in either Short or Crabbe.135 In
Lentz, however, the court overruled Short and Crabbe and extended immunity to a physical
127Id. at 317, 321 S.E.2d at 666 (Cochran, J., dissenting).
128 See supra notes 45-50 and accompanying text.
121 Messina, 228 Va. at 317, 321 S.E.2d at 666 (Cochran, J., dissenting).13 0 id.
131 236 Va. 78, 372 S.E.2d 608 (1988).
132 220 Va. 53, 54, 255 S.E.2d 479, 480 (1979).
133 209 Va. 356, 357, 164 S.E.2d 639, 640 (1968).
134 See Short, 220 Va. at 56, 255 S.E.2d at 481; Crabbe, 209 Va. at 357, 164 S.E.2d at 640.
135 See Short, 220 Va. at 56, 255 S.E.2d at 481; Crabbe, 209 Va. at 359, 164 S.E.2d at 641.
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education teacher when he was sued for injuries Lentz sustained during class as a result of
alleged negligent supervision of the physical education activities.
136
The court based its holding on the factors set forth in the Messina case, that is, the four-
part test created in James.137 Essentially then, the court did not reconcile any prior case law.
Instead, the court merely reaffirmed the test created in James and overruled Short and Crabbe to
create uniform treatment of school officials. 138 Once again, the court declined to elaborate on the
various prongs of the James test and did not take advantage of the opportunity to clarify how the
discretion prong of the test should be applied. 139 Regarding the discretion prong, the court
merely stated that "a teacher's supervision and control of a physical education class... clearly
involves, at least in part, the exercise of judgment and discretion."'
140
E. Gargiulo v. Ohar - 1990
Shortly after its decision in Lentz, the Supreme Court of Virginia decided Gargiulo v.
Ohar. 141 The issue decided by the Ohar court was similar to the issue in James. In Ohar, the
issue was "whether... a licensed, board certified physician--a salaried employee of a state
hospital engaged as a fellow in a medical research and training program conducted by the
hospital--was entitled to sovereign immunity." 142 The plaintiff, Patricia Gargiulo, suffered from
a "chronic disease of the connective tissues" known as "progressive systemic sclerosis or
116 Lentz, 236 Va. at 82, 371 S.E.2d at 610.
137 See id. at 82-83, 372 S.E.2d at 610-11.
138 Id. The dissent notes that Crabbe was decided "[t]wo decades ago" and that it was affirmed by the court in Short
only nine years prior to its decision in Lentz. Id. at 84, 372 S.E.2d at 611 (Stephenson, J., dissenting). The dissent
further notes that "[i]t is significant that in the past 20 years the General Assembly has not enacted legislation
overruling Crabbe. Presumably, therefore, a majority in the General Assembly believes that the decision in Crabbe
represents sound public policy." Id.
139 The court merely states each factor of the four-part test that it is applying, then a sentence stating that the
employee meets that factor so as to rise to the level of immunity. Id. at 82-83, 371 S.E.2d at 610-11 (majority
opinion).
140 Id. at 83, 372 S.E.2d at 611.
141239 Va. 209, 387 S.E.2d 787 (1990).
142 Id. at 210, 387 S.E.2d at 788.
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scleroderma .,,143 Dr. Fowler, a member of the faculty and attending physician at the Medical
College of Virginia ("MCV"), created "a protocol for a research and training program to study
scleroderma."' 144 Following this protocol and under the supervision of Dr. Fowler, Gargiulo
alleged that Dr. Jill Ohar negligently secured a heart catheter in Gargiulo thereby causing her to
become comatose and suffer severe permanent injuries."'145 Gargiulo sued Dr. Ohar for medical
malpractice in negligently securing the heart catheter. 146
The court applied the James four-part test and concluded that Dr. Ohar was entitled to
immunity under the doctrine of sovereign immunity. 147 With respect to the discretion prong of
the test, the court stated, "[t]he third element. . . 'not always determinative,' is whether the
employee was performing judgmental rather than ministerial duties." 148 The court determined
that because Dr. Ohar was "required to make multiple professional judgments" she was "like the
intern in Lawhorne, 'vested with and required to exercise discretion and judgment in connection
with those persons who presented themselves as patients." ' 149 Although this rationale is in
accordance with James, it still presents the same dilemma. What did the court mean by
"discretion," and how should the discretion prong of the four-part test be applied? In other
words, what is the difference between the professional judgments made by an attending
physician and those made by a surgical intern; do they not both constitute discretion?
The court again declined to define "discretion" or a "discretionary act" and instead
overlapped the discretion prong with the "control and direction of the state" prong. Dr. Ohar was
treated like the intern in Lawhorne because she was "subject to review by physicians on the
143 Id. at 211, 387 S.E.2d at 788.
144Id. at 211, 387 S.E.2d at 788.
145 Id. at 211, 387 S.E.2d at 789.
146 Id. at 210, 387 S.E.2d at 788.
147Id. at 215, 387 S.E.2d at 791.
148 Id. at 213, 387 S.E.2d at 790.
149Id. at 214, 387 S.E.2d at 790 (quoting Lawhome v. Harlan, 214 Va. 405, 408, 200 S.E.2d 569, 572 (1973)).
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faculty or medical staff at MCV" and thus was under more control of the state. 150 The court's
rationale was based on the fact that the physicians in James were "members of the faculty of a
state medical school and doctors serving in the state hospital, but their relationship with the
plaintiff was that of physician-patient."' 151 "By comparison, Dr. Ohar's function was to assist as
an employee and student in the conduct of a basic medical program," thus she was like the intern
in Lawhorne.152 Again, while this reasoning is certainly consistent with the reasoning in James,
it does not effectively advise the lower courts on how to uniformly apply the "discretion" prong
of the four-part test.
Based on the review of the cases decided since James, it is clear that the distinctions
made in the sovereign immunity cases involving professionals in the medical field have become
fuzzy. It seems that the court chose not to define "discretion" or a "discretionary act" and chose
not to instruct the lower courts on how to properly apply the discretion prong, but instead often
blurred the discretion prong with the state control prong. In doing so, the court inadvertently
opened the door for inconsistent results in cases involving professionals in the medical field.
F. Colby v. Boyden - 1991
One year after its decision in Ohar, the Supreme Court of Virginia again examined the
issue of sovereign immunity for a state employee in Colby v. Boyden. 153 The facts in Colby,
however, were far different from the facts in many of the cases the court had previously decided
on the issue of sovereign immunity for state employees. Up to this point, the court's decisions
0o Id. at 214, 387 S.E.2d at 790.
151 Id. at 213, 387 S.E.2d at 790.
152Id. at 213, 387 S.E.2d at 790.
153 241 Va. 125, 400 S.E.2d 184 (1991); see, e.g., Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hylton, 260 Va. 56, 64, 530 S.E.2d
421, 424 (2000) (holding that a police officer who collided with another vehicle while in pursuit of a person who
had committed a traffic violation was entitled to sovereign immunity); .see also Stanfield v. Peregoy, 245 Va. 339,
343, 429 S.E.2d 11, 13 (1993) (holding that the operator of a snow plow was entitled to immunity because it "clearly
involved, at least in part, the exercise ofjudgment and discretion by the driver") (citing Lentz v. Morris, 236 Va. 78,
83, 372 S.E.2d 608, 611 (1988)).
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were primarily based on facts that involved professional services (teaching, performing surgery,
etc.) In Colby, the court examined the issue of the operation of a motor vehicle. Specifically, the
issue was "the degree of negligence required to impose civil liability for injuries resulting from
the actions of a police officer who violates traffic laws while pursuing a fleeing lawbreaker."
154
It is important to note that this case involved the operation of a motor vehicle, as opposed to a
case involving professional services, because it was at this point that the ministerial act versus
discretionary act analysis was discussed in the context of the discretion prong of the James test.
The plaintiff, Patricia E. Colby, approached an intersection and the light for her lane had
turned green. 155 "She slowed, looked to the left and right, and seeing or hearing nothing,
proceeded into the intersection." 156 When she reached the middle of the intersection, her car was
struck by a vehicle operated by Officer William H. Boyden, who "activated his sirens for a short
burst as he neared the intersection" in pursuit of another vehicle who had run the red light.'57
Officer Boyden argued that he was immune from suit under the doctrine of sovereign
immunity. 158 The court held that Officer Boyden was entitled to immunity because he satisfied
the four-part test in James and his actions did not amount to gross negligence, but simple
negligence. 159
The court began its analysis by stating, "the question of whether a particular act is
entitled to the protection of sovereign immunity depends on whether the act under consideration
is classified as discretionary or ministerial in nature." 160 The court then applied the James four-
part test. The court identified the function in this case as "enforcement of traffic laws" and noted
154 Colby, 241 Va. at 127, 400 S.E.2d at 185.
155 Id. at 127, 400 S.E.2d at 185.
156 Id. at 127, 400 S.E.2d at 185.
157Id. at 127, 400 S.E.2d at 185.
158 Id. at 127, 400 S.E.2d at 185.
159 Id. at 130, 133, 400 S.E.2d 187, 189.
160Id. at 128-29, 400 S.E.2d at 186.
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the obvious important interests the sovereign has in this function. 161 In examining the discretion
prong of the test, the court stated that when an officer is engaged in an emergency situation,
"[s]uch situations involve necessarily discretionary split-second decisions balancing grave
personal risks, public safety concerns, and the need to achieve the governmental objective."
162
As for the state control prong, the court noted that the city "exercised administrative control and
supervision" over the officer by promulgating guidelines to govern an officer's actions when
responding to emergency situations. 163 Finally, the court re-visited its ministerial versus
discretionary analysis, which was in place prior to the promulgation of the James four-part test,
and the discretion prong seemed to have a concrete and uniform application. The court appeared
to demonstrate that in order to determine whether the discretion prong of the James test had been
satisfied, the question was whether the employee was performing a ministerial act or a
discretionary act. That is, if the act is ministerial, and it is performed improperly, then the
employee would not be immune. This is the exact analysis that the court made in Lawhorne, just
prior to its decision in James creating the four-part test.
164
While the court finally gave some teeth to the definition of discretion and the application
of the discretion prong, critics might argue that there was still an inherent conflict in the court's
analysis. The argument would be that because there were guidelines to govern the officer's
response to emergency situations, just as there are guidelines to govern normal traffic operations,
then the act the officer was performing was arguably ministerial. The court, however, noted that
"those guidelines do not, and cannot, eliminate the requirement that a police officer, engaged in
the delicate, dangerous, and potentially deadly job of vehicular pursuit, must make prompt,
161 Id. at 129, 400 S.E.2d at 187.
162Id. at 129-30, 400 S.E.2d at 187.
163 Id. at 129, 400 S.E.2d at 187.
164 See supra notes 45-50.
Winter 2008
Richmond Journal ofLaw and the Public Interest
original, and crucial decisions in a highly stressful situation." 165 The court continued, "[u]nlike
the driver in routine traffic, the officer must make difficult judgments about the best means of
effectuating the governmental purpose by embracing special risks in an emergency situation."
166
Colby was decided ten years after James, yet finally added some clarity to the issue of
how the discretion prong of the James test should be applied. At this point, it seemed that the
court was defining discretion for purposes of the discretion prong in the James test as a
distinction between a ministerial act, one that can only be performed in a particular manner, and
a discretionary act, one that can be performed in several different ways. If this were in fact what
the court was accomplishing in Colby, then the lingering issue at this point would be whether this
analysis is only applicable in cases involving the operation of motor vehicles, or whether it is
also applicable to professional services cases (i.e. those involving teachers or doctors). The
argument would be that motor vehicle cases often involve statutory mandates, while professional
services cases often involve highly technical training. Thus, while a statutorily mandated duty
would clearly be a ministerial act, a professionally mandated duty might be a ministerial act, a
discretionary act, or a combination of both.
G. Heider v. Clemons - 1991
In the same year it decided Colby, the Supreme Court of Virginia again examined the
issue of whether a law enforcement officer operating a motor vehicle was entitled to immunity in
Heider v. Clemons. 167 The issue in Heider was "whether a sheriff is entitled to the defense of
sovereign immunity when he is sued for damages incurred as a result of his operation of an
automobile while serving judicial process."1 6 8 Deputy Ferdinand J. Heider was serving judicial
165 Colby, 241 Va. at 129, 400 S.E. 2d at 187.
16 6
Id. at 129, 400 S.E.2d at 187.
167 241 Va. 143, 400 S.E.2d 190 (1991).
168 Id. at 144, 400 S.E.2d at 190.
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process at a private residence. 169 When Deputy Heider returned to his car to leave the parking
space he, "in order to get over a 'lip' in the asphalt," gave the car "a little more gas."17 As he
pulled out, Deputy Hieder collided with a motorcycle being operated by Demetrick Clemons.
171
Deputy Heider asserted that he was immune under the doctrine of sovereign immunity. 1
72
Unlike the Officer in Colby, the court held that Deputy Heider was not immune under the
doctrine of sovereign immunity because the operation of his vehicle at that time was ministerial,
not discretionary. 
173
The court began its analysis by citing James, and then stated that the defense of sovereign
immunity "does not apply to 'the performance of duties which do not involve judgment or
discretion in their performance but which are purely ministerial.' 174 The court held, "[w]hile
every person driving a car must make a myriad of decisions, in ordinary driving situations, the
duty of due care is a ministerial obligation." 175 The court noted that sometimes the operation of a
motor vehicle may fall into the category of "discretionary," as it did in Colby, but based on the
facts in this case, it did not rise to such a level. 176 Based on the court's decisions in both Colby
and Heider, it is apparent that the court had re-visited its discretionary act versus ministerial act
analysis and incorporated it into the James test. As stated above, however, it is unclear how this







173 Id. at 145, 400 S.E.2d at 191.
174 Id. (citing Wynn v. Gandy, 170 Va. 590, 595, 197 S.E. 527, 529 (1938) (holding that a bus driver was not entitled
to sovereign immunity)).
175 Heider at 145, 400 S.E.2d at 191.
176 Id.
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H. Lohr v. Larsen - 1993
Two years after the Supreme Court of Virginia decided the motor vehicle cases, Colby
and Heider, the court decided Lohr v. Larsen, another professional services case. 177 Much like
the issue in Ohar, the issue in Lohr was also "whether a state-employed public health physician
is entitled to the protection of the doctrine of sovereign immunity from liability for his alleged
acts of ordinary negligence."'178 Paige Lohr sued Dr. George Douglass Larsen for failing to order
the appropriate tests after detecting a lump in Lohr's breasts. 179 Lohr went to the Waynesboro
Public Health clinic to obtain birth control pills and the law of Virginia required Lohr to have a
physical examination before she could be prescribed birth control pills.180 Dr. Larsen was a
board certified physician assigned to the clinic and according to the trial court, "[t]he State...
controls, absolutely, when and where Dr. Larsen works, the number and identity of the patients
he sees, the equipment he uses, the procedures he can perform... and.., the medication he can
prescribe."' 181 The court applied the James four-part test and held that the trial court did not err
in sustaining Larsen's plea of sovereign immunity. 
182
In making its decision, the court addressed the discretion prong of the James test, as well
as the other three prongs of the James test, and how they should be applied to Dr. Larsen;
however, it did not apply the discretionary versus ministerial analysis that it had applied just two
years prior in Colby and Heider. 183 With respect to the "state's interest in the function" prong,
the court stated that "because the broad discretion vested in the physicians in James was not
attendant to actions that were integral to the Commonwealth's interest or function, there was no
177 Lohr v. Larsen, 246 Va. 81, 431 S.E.2d 642 (1993).




181 Id. at 83-84, 431 S.E.2d at 643.
182 Id. at 85, 88, 431 S.E.2d at 643, 646.
183 Id. at 85-88, 431 S.E.2d at 643-46.
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immunity." 184 The court then stated, "in this case, however.., the exercise of discretion was an
integral part of the Commonwealth's health care program."'185 Thus, the court indicated that
while the factual circumstances were similar in James and Lohr, the interests of the
Commonwealth in each case were different enough to warrant immunity in one case and not in
the other.
In James the court stated that the "paramount interest of the Commonwealth of Virginia
is that the University of Virginia operate a good medical school and that it be staffed with
efficient and competent administrators and professors." 186 In Lohr, the court stated that the
interest was "to provide quality medical care in certain specified areas for citizens of this State
who are economically unable to acquire those services in the private sector," and that "these
health care services could not be delivered without using skilled physicians."'187 It is not exactly
clear how these interests differ in such a way that would grant immunity to one doctor and not
the other, but this was the result. Both interests require a state operated facility to be staffed with
competent and skilled professionals. Why is it then, that Dr. Larsen was immune from liability
while the doctors in James were not?
188
Why the court abandoned its ministerial versus discretionary analysis for purposes of this
case is unclear; however, in doing so, the court applied the same test to almost identical facts to
achieve two different results. To explain the outcome in Lohr, despite the opposite outcome in
James, the court stated that the discretion prong of the James test is "the level of discretion
required of a government employee in performing his job and whether the employee is
184 Id. at 87, 431 S.E.2d at 645.
185 Id.
186 James, 221 Va. at 54, 282 S.E.2d at 870.
187 Lohr, 246 Va. at 86, 431 S.E.2d at 644-645.
188 The dissent in this case explains that the facts in this case are "indistinguishable" from the facts in James. Lohr at
92, 431 S.E.2d at 648 (Hassel, J., and Keenan, J., dissenting). The dissent notes that "the only reason that the
majority has chosen not to adhere to James v. Jane is because it is concerned that the physicians might not
participate in public health programs unless they are immune for their negligent acts." Id.
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exercising that discretion in the discharge of his duties when the allegedly negligent act
occurred."' 189 The court explained that "if a broad discretion is vested in a government employee
in performing the function complained of... it will weigh heavily in favor of a government
employee's claim of immunity." 190 The court, however, stated that because Larsen could not
choose his patients or waive their fees, as the doctors in James could, he was immune.1 91 Thus,
the court seemed to be indicating that what is needed to meet the discretion prong of the James
test is not that "discretion" be used at the time of the actual negligent act, rather that the State be
exercising a large amount of control over the employee when the negligence occurs. 192 This
reasoning is slightly problematic. Is it possible for one to exercise a broad amount of discretion
while being strictly controlled by someone else?
The court recognized this conflict:
[a]t first glance, the issue of wide discretion that influences our consideration of
the grant of governmental immunity in applying the third element of the James v.
Jane test appears to be at odds with our consideration of a higher level of
governmental control in the application of the fourth element of that test in this
case."
193
The court then attempted to reconcile the conflict by stating that "when a government employee
is specially trained to make discretionary decisions, the government's control must necessarily
be limited in order to make maximum use of that training..." 194 In its next breath, the court
stated that "the Commonwealth's direction and control of Dr. Larsen was far greater than its
control of the physicians in James. These physicians 'exercised broad discretion in selecting the
methods by which they cared for [their patients] ,,,195 Thus, the court essentially held that in
189 Id. at 87, 431 S.E.2d at 645.
190 Id.
191 See id. at 86, 431 S.E.2d at 644-45.
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order to be immune, one must be exercise a large amount of discretion, at the same time,
however, be subject to strict control by the state. 
196
After the court's holding in Lohr, an entirely new issue arose with respect to the
discretion prong. That is, how can the court reconcile the state control prong and the discretion
prong? What had developed up to this point was a disparity in the application of the James test
in several respects. First, there was the issue of whether the ministerial act versus discretionary
act analysis remained applicable in light of the court's creation of the four-part test in James.
While it appeared to have been taken out of the sovereign immunity analysis, it reappeared in the
court's decisions in Colby and Heider. Second, there was the issue of the interplay between the
discretion prong and the state control prong and whether the two prongs could be applied as the
court had applied them in Lohr. That is, if the court required the exercise of a large amount of
discretion to qualify for immunity, then how could it also require a large amount of state control
to qualify for immunity?
I. Linhart v. Lawson - 2001
With these two issues still lingering, the Supreme Court of Virginia again decided a
sovereign immunity case involving the operation of a motor vehicle in Linhart v. Larson.197 One
of the main issues in Linhart was whether Thomas Lawson, an employee of the school board,
was immune under the doctrine of sovereign immunity when he negligently struck Francis
Linhart Jr.'s vehicle while operating a school bus.198 The trial court found Lawson immune
under the doctrine of sovereign immunity and the court affirmed this finding. 199 The court
196 See e.g., Adkins v. Dixon, 253 Va. 275, 482 S.E.2d 797 (1997). InAdkins, the court noted that "[a] high level of
control weights in favor of immunity; a low level of control weighs against immunity. Id. at 280, S.E.2d at 800-801
(citing Lohr v. Larsen, 246 Va. 81, 88, 431 S.E.2d 642, 646 (1993)). Because the Commonwealth "had almost no
control" over the defendant in Adkins, the defendant was not granted immunity. Id. at 280, S.E.2d at 801.
197 261 Va. 30, 540 S.E.2d 875 (2001).
198 Id. at 32-33, 540 S.E.2d at 876.
199 Id. at 36-37, 540 S.E.2d at 878.
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briefly re-examined the trial court's findings with respect to the four-part test in James.20 0 As for
the first two prongs of the test, the court agreed with the trial court that "the transportation of
children in a school bus is a governmental function in which the government has a substantial
interest." 20 1 With respect to the "control and direction of the state" prong, the court again agreed
with the trial court finding that "the government exercises significant control [over bus drivers]
as reflected in the regulations issued regarding the qualifications for and requirements of the
job.
20 2
As to discretion, the court found that "transporting school children involved discretion
and judgment." 20 3 The court did not elaborate on its finding of the required "control and
direction" of the state or the required "discretion" in its opinion, again leaving the issue open for
discussion and interpretation by the lower courts. However, based on the court's rulings in the
other motor vehicle operation cases, Colby and Heider, it is slightly easier to discern what the
court meant by "discretion" in this case. That is, that the unpredictability of the children's
actions on the bus made the function of operating the bus more discretionary as opposed to
ministerial. Thus, at this point, the court affirmed its adoption of the ministerial act versus a
discretionary act in cases involving the operation of a motor vehicle by government employees.
What remains an unanswered question is whether the court intended for this analysis to also be
applied in cases involving professional services, such as teaching and performing surgery.
J. Friday-Spivey v. Collier - 2004
More recently, the Supreme Court of Virginia decided Friday-Spivey v. Collier, another
motor vehicle operation case, and attempted to extensively address the issue of "discretion"
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under the doctrine of sovereign immunity. 20 4 The facts of this case are slightly analogous to
those in Linhart.20 5 Charles Lee Collier was operating a fire truck when he collided with Julian
Friday-Spivey's vehicle. 20 6 Collier was on his way to a shopping mall in response to a "Priority
2" dispatch regarding an infant locked in a vehicle at the mall of whose condition he was not
aware of when he responded to the dispatch.2 °7 When responding to a Priority 2 call, the Fairfax
County Fire Department Standard Operating Procedures required that Collier "proceed without
activating warning devices.., and to obey all statutes governing the operation of motor
vehicles," yet he needed to "drop everything and proceed to the call., 20 8 In deciding how to
proceed to the call, Collier testified that he "decided to take the quickest route possible" because
he "just did not know what to expect" when he got there. 20 9 The court applied the four-part test
outlined in James and found that Collier (much like Heider) did not exercise the appropriate
amount of discretion to rise above the level of a ministerial act, thus was not entitled to
immunity.
210
Collier argued that he was responding to an emergency situation and testified, "I have to
be extra careful when I'm driving the fire truck, it's not like driving my personal car on the
,,211road. In response to Collier's argument, the court stated, "[d]espite a natural inclination to
classify the report of a child in a locked car as an 'emergency,' the facts of this case do not
204 268 Va. 384, 386, 601 S.E.2d 591 (2004).
205 See generally Linhart v. Lawson, 261 Va. 30, 540 S.E.2d 875 (2001).
206Id. at 386, 601 S.E.2d at 592.
207Id. at 387, 601 S.E.2d at 592.
208 Id.
209Id. at 387, 601 S.E.2d at 593.
210Id. at 391, 601 S.E.2d at 595.
211d. at 387, 601 S.E.2d at 593; see generally James v. Jane, 221 Va. 43, 282 S.E.2d 864; Heider v. Clemons, 241
Va. 143 400 S.E.2d 190.
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support that the conclusion that Collier's driving involved the exercise of judgment and
discretions beyond that required for ordinary driving in routine traffic situations.
'" 212
The court pointed out that during his deposition, Collier admitted that he knew "there was
no danger" involved and he was supposed to respond in a "nonemergency manner" to Priority 2
calls. 213 Thus, because Collier knew that he was supposed to obey all traffic law and he did not,
the court held that he was performing a ministerial function.
2 14
This decision is clearly in line with the court's prior decisions involving the operation of
a motor vehicle, such as Colby and Hieder. By contrast, critics of the court's decision in Spivey
argue that "the case represents a significant departure from prior decisions." 215 These critics
"anticipate that with the court's decision in Spivey, the argument will be made that sovereign
immunity applies to a driver of an emergency vehicle, only if the lights and siren have been
activated., 216 As is evidenced by the court's decision in Colby and Spivey, this is clearly not
what the court intended. In Colby, the officer, by virtue of the emergency situation, was
permitted to use discretion in deciding how to pursue the fleeing suspect, 2 17 while in Spivey, the
officer, by virtue of the non-emergency situation, was not permitted to use any discretion in
deciding how to respond to the Priority 2 call.
218
As stated above, while the ministerial act versus a discretionary act analysis has been
consistently applied to cases involving the operation of a motor vehicle, whether or not it also
applies to cases involving professional services remains uncertain. In addition, what remains
212 Id. at 389, 601 S.E.2d at 594.
213 Id. at 390, 601 S.E.2d at 594.
214Id. at 390, 601 S.E.2d at 595.
215 John D. McGavin and Julia B. Judkins, Sovereign Immunity: Is it Alive and Well In Virginia After Friday-Spivey
v. Collier?, 17 J. OF Civ. LITIG. 205, 205 (Nov. 3, 2005) (discussing the state of sovereign immunity after the court's
decision in Spivey).2 16 Id. at 207.
217 Colby, 241 Va. At 129-30.
211 See Spivey, 268 Va. at 387, 601 S.E.2d at 592.
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unclear is how the court can require an employee to exercise discretion and at the same time be
under strict control by the state in order to be shielded from liability under the doctrine of
sovereign immunity.
Perhaps applying the ministerial versus discretionary analysis when analyzing the
discretion prong in professional services, as the court does in motor vehicle cases, would create
more uniformity and better explain how the court can require the exercise of discretion while
also requiring state control in order to be shielded from liability under the doctrine of sovereign
immunity. For example, if this analysis were applied in professional services cases involving
doctors, then the ministerial act would constitute whatever the medical protocol is in a particular
situation. Thus, if a physician violates the appropriate protocol, that would constitute a violation
of a ministerial duty and immunity would not be afforded to the employee. If, on the other hand,
there is no uniform protocol in a particular medical situation, then the physician would be
performing a discretionary act and immunity would be afforded to the employee. In that
circumstance, whether or not the state is exercising a great deal of control would not affect the
discretion prong.
IV. Professional Commentaries
In light of the variances in the Supreme Court of Virginia's rulings on the application of
the four-part test created in James, at least with respect to professional services cases, it is
beneficial to examine how practitioners in the Commonwealth view the discretion prong of the
test. As one might expect, the practitioners interviewed for this article were split on how they
viewed the application and meaning of the discretion prong.
For example, Mr. Thomas E. Albro of Tremblay & Smith, LLP in Charlottesville,
Virginia, who represented the plaintiff in James, commented that what the court meant by
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"discretion" in the four-part test is "the single greatest problem with analyzing sovereign
immunity." 219 Mr. Albro continued, "[a]t the end of the day, discretion as a concept is totally
elastic. It can mean as little or as much as you want it mean .... 220 When asked what would
make the application of the test easier, Mr. Albro suggested, "Take [discretion] out and deal with
a three-prong test. Do you have immunity; do you not have immunity? Then, if you have
immunity, you can lose it if you're grossly negligent, or if you're performing a ministerial act
that does not require the exercise of discretion.
'" 221
Under Mr. Albro's approach, the discretion concept would essentially be applied
differently according to the function being performed. If the function is one involving
professional services, then a gross negligence analysis would be applied in place of the discretion
prong; and if the function is one involving the operation of a motor vehicle, then a
"discretionary" versus "ministerial" act analysis would be applied as the discretion prong.
Mr. Albro's suggested modification to the James test is not an unfounded one. For
example, Mr. Gregory E. Lucyk, former Chief of the Trial Section in the Virginia Office of the
Attorney General, and now the Chief Staff Attorney for the Supreme Court of Virginia, indicated
that he believes the court is already applying the discretion prong of the test in that manner - that
is, dependent upon what function the employee is performing. Mr. Lucyk stated:
it's better to look at the discrete function that we are talking about -- vehicle
operations is one category of cases; professional services, like physicians and
court-appointed lawyers is another category of cases. Discretion is important in
the analysis for vehicle operations cases; however, you probably don't even need
to address that prong in the doctor cases.
222
219 Interview with Thomas E. Albro, Partner, Tremblay & Smith LLP, in Charlottesville, Va. (Mar. 8, 2006). Mr.
Albro also represented the plaintiff in Lohr v. Larsen, 246 Va. 81, 431 S.E.2d 642 (1993).
220 id.
221 Id.
222 Interview with Gregory E. Lucyk, Chief Staff Attorney, Supreme Court of Virginia, Richmond Virginia (Mar. 9,
2006).
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Mr. Lucyk pointed out that unlike the motor vehicle cases where the discretion prong is the
determinative issue, it is typically the state control prong that is the determinative issue in
professional services cases. 223 It is submitted that if this is the case, that the discretion prong is
applied differently depending on the function at issue, then perhaps a clarification by the court as
to the weight to be given to discretion in applying the test to various functions is warranted.
On the other hand, however, the Honorable Randall G. Johnson, now deceased, and the
Honorable Theodore J. Markow of the Circuit Court of City of Richmond, pointed out that the
reason a court focuses on discretion in one case and state control in another is simply because
that is what the facts have necessitated.224 In other words, just because discretion is not the main
issue in a professional services case, but might be in a motor vehicle operations case, does not
mean that the test is faulty or difficult to apply. Neither Judge Johnson nor Judge Markow felt
that the test needed to be altered in any way to be appropriately and effectively applied.225
Conversely, the Honorable Edward L. Hogshire of the Circuit Court of City of
Charlottesville, commented that while he had not yet been faced with the issue of discretion head
on, it seems that the "more discretion an employee has, the less likely they are to be immune."
226
Judge Hogshire stated that it "defies common sense" to conclude that someone has broad
discretion, yet is simultaneously subject to a vast amount of control.227 In other words, in order
to satisfy both the discretion and the state control prong to achieve immunity as it is has been
outlined by the court thus far, a state employee must be able to exercise broad discretion, yet the
state must have strict control over the employee.
223 Id.
224 Interview with the late Honorable Randall G. Johnson, Judge, and the Honorable Theodore J. Markow, Chief
Judge, Circuit Court of City of Richmond, in Richmond, Va. (Mar. 15, 2006).
225 Id.
226 Interview with the Honorable Edward L. Hogshire, Judge, Circuit Court of City of Charlottesville, in
Charlottesville, Va. (Apr. 3, 2006).
227 id.
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V. Conclusion
The discretion prong of the four-part test that the Supreme Court of Virginia created in
James has not been uniformly explained by the court, which has led to non-uniform application
in certain cases. This is evident in the court's varying decisions since the creation of the test, as
well as the differing opinions by professionals in the Commonwealth on how to appropriately
apply the discretion prong of test. In support of this contention, one need not look any further
than the amount of sovereign immunity cases taken to the Supreme Court of Virginia since
James was decided. This article cites at least ten cases (a list which is not exhaustive) that the
court has heard since the creation of the four-part test in James, most of which focus on the
application of the discretion prong of the four-part test.
228
In addition to the vast number of cases that have been brought before the court regarding
the application of the four-part test, the fact that practicing attorneys and presiding judges have
differing views on exactly how the four-test should be applied, particularly as to the discretion
prong, is evidence that a clarification of how to apply the discretion prong of the test may be
necessary. For instance, if the purpose of the law is predictability, then those who might benefit
from sovereign immunity should be able to accurately predict whether or not their conduct will
lead to liability.229 Otherwise, many positions that are vital to the community, such as teachers,
doctors, police officers, fire fighters, highway maintenance workers, and school bus drivers, will
228 See supra notes 92, 104, 116, 131, 141, 153, 167, 177, 197, 204. Interestingly, Mr. Albro commented that, "[t]he
problem for those of us who do medical malpractice work, is that the successive decisions in the medical
malpractice field incite more litigation because what they tell those of us practicing in this area is that the rules are
so flexible and the tests are so vague that it's always worth taking an appeal to the Supreme Court of Virginia
because [you] don't know what you're going to get." Interview with Thomas E. Albro, supra note 219.
229 For example, Linda Walke Lilly of the Division of Risk Management for the Department of the Treasury for the
Commonwealth of Virginia, commented that employees of the sovereign "most certainly" worry about whether or
not they will be liable in certain situations. Interview with Linda Walke Lilly, Assistant Director, Division of Risk
Management for the Department of the Treasury for the Commonwealth of Virginia, in Richmond, Va. (Apr. 5,
2006). Ms. Lilly noted that when one employee is sued for an incident that took place on the job, other similarly
situated employees will inquire as to whether or not they would be liable had it happened to them. Id.
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be that much harder to fill. Furthermore, there is a risk of disparate treatment of employees in
similarly situated circumstances simply because the circuit courts in each area might interpret the
same test in different ways.
While the discretion prong of the test is problematic, it is clear that the test should not be
discarded in its entirety. Instead, perhaps Mr. Albro's suggestion would be best. On the other
hand, perhaps the court could clarify in which cases the ministerial act versus discretionary act
plays a part in the analysis. Furthermore, if the court intends for the discretion analysis to differ
depending on the function the employee is performing, which appears to be the case given the
varying analysis in motor vehicle cases versus professional services cases, delineating such a
position would be beneficial to the legal community as a whole, as it would lead to a more
uniform application of the test. Ultimately, until a clarification is made, the court may find itself
hearing many more sovereign immunity cases in the future.
Winter 2008
